PROPOSED REFORMATION OF MONEY MARKET FUNDS

The Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority, along with the Financial Stability Board, are putting forward proposals for reforming Money Market Funds (MMFs).
These proposals have been created to reinforce and enhance the resilience of said MMFs in the wake of some serious and frightening potential damage the financial markets faced as a result of the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic and the ensuing panic.

The turbulence witnessed in March 2020 triggered a remarkable outpouring of MMFs, thence uncovering weaknesses, and without the intervention of central banks with quantitative easing (although not directly supporting MMFs this action aided relief on redemption demand due to there being more cash in the system), this could have led to the suspension of MMFs in turn affecting negatively the ability for large corporates to access their cash held in the funds and subsequently creating potentially acute implications on the real economy.

The immoderate redeeming of MMFs during the market turmoil was due mainly to investors looking to access cash in order to meet margin requirements elsewhere in other financial products or for the fear of not being able to see their cash in the future because of fund suspension. This caused what was dubbed a ‘dash for cash’ scenario, where investors sought to gain ‘first mover advantage’, seeking to be among the first to redeem their assets before any possible suspension of the fund due to money shortages plus making sure they bore no redeeming costs.

Deemed a low-risk investment, MMFs are primarily utilised to hold cash rather than being seen as a way to fatten profits and can usually be redeemed and settled on demand on the same day. However, many of the assets have a longer maturity and this can create a liquidity mismatch.
In normal market conditions, this wouldn’t be seen as a problem for the fund managers but with wild volatility, such as what was experienced in March 2020, this does become an enormous issue leaving them exposed to potentially gargantuan and damaging losses which would quite obviously generate a domino effect throughout the financial system due to the funds not being able to maintain required liquidity levels.

Without the intervention of the central banks, we would more than likely have seen suspension of MMFs to protect the fund manager, who would be taking into account the safety of the participants in the fund, and in turn meaning the investors, many of which are banks, would not have access to their monies causing a potential avalanche of damage to the financial system.
MMFs are key suppliers of short-term financing for financial institutions, governments and corporations as well as retail and institutional investors.

Considered to be cash equivalent, MMFs look to furnish principal stability and daily liquidity, with the weightiest borrowers being governments and banks.

But two very prominent vulnerabilities were made apparent in the turmoil of March 2020. The most dominant one being that of unanticipated and sudden redemptions, which is majorly disruptive, and the fund experiencing great difficulty in selling assets it holds.

So, the regulatory bodies are asking for opinions of MMF managers, users and any other participants in short term funding markets, to be submitted by 23 July 2022.

Amongst the several possible solutions visualised was that of simply charging the investor the cost of its fund redemption.

One way of actioning this is by introducing ‘swing pricing’, allowing the fund manager to reduce the funds’ net asset value (NAV) when outpouring goes beyond a pre-determined ‘swing threshold’. Within this scenario, the redemption costs are accumulated by the selling investors and not by those remaining in the fund, thus protecting them from the consequences of the outpouring (for instance, the weakening of the MMF shares value) and once the outflowing returns to normal levels, the NAV will recover to its level before adjustment.

However, fund managers may not be keen to utilise swing pricing because of the stigma attached to it. Also, it may prove a dilemma as to where to set the factor. If it’s too small, then not all of the redemption costs will be passed on to the sellers.

In this case, the authorities could alleviate the problem by defining minimum swing parameters, but once again a dilemma arises insofar as they may not be able to ascertain where they should set it. On top of this, they may witness investors predicting changes in the parameters and redeeming pre-emptively.
Another possible solution is to introduce ‘Minimum Balance at Risk’ (MBR) whereby a smallish percentage of each investors shares would be unable to be redeemed. This lessens the amount of liquidity accessible, only by a small margin however, should a redeeming investor be looking to withdraw a considerable amount of their monies.

So, the idea is that the MBR decreases risk of losses that investors remaining in the fund could disproportionately sustain, thereby lessening any motivation to redeem.
In rare scenarios where the fund suffers a material loss over a short period of time, the losses would be consumed by the MBR shares in a manner where the largest down to the least in order of recent redemptions would suffer proportionately.

Potential redeemers therefore are faced with the decision as to whether to redeem and achieve liquidity, which could mean they bear the bulk of losses in a stress event, or to leave alone. This in theory would ease pressure on selling but it’s doubtful it would prevent any considerable redemptions in a case of increased appetite for liquidity.

A third option suggested is that of a ‘Capital Buffer’.

In this instance, any losses would be absorbed by the capital buffer, supporting the funds NAV. The capital buffer could be held outside of the MMF allaying the risk of losses being hit on the investors.
This should reduce redemption appetite but once again if aggregated demand for liquidity bears its head, this would not be able to stop it.

A capital buffer would also be costly to maintain, and it may even cause a dip in net yields.
The next option is reducing threshold effects. I’ll keep this one as short, sweet and understandable as possible, as it takes in many variants. In essence, this would entail removing links between regulatory thresholds and the enforcing of fees and gates.

This would furnish the MMF with the ability to impose fees regardless of their liquidity levels. This in turn could minimise the chances of pre-emptive runs but as described in prior options, it would still be vulnerable to large scale redemptions in the event of liquidity stress. This is also another option that given the stigma attached to it, MMFs may be reluctant to employ it.

Other ideas to be discussed include removing the stable NAV. This could disincentivise investors to redeem because a fluctuating NAV may fall beneath the threshold at which the fund must alter the way it sets its valuation and reprice its shares. But this still does not erase the possibility of redeemers still forcing liquidity on those remaining in the fund.

There could be limits of eligible assets whereby the MMF is made to place a greater proportion of its assets into shorter dated and/or more liquid products, making it easier for the MMF to absorb large redemptions. But this in turn would reduce yields, making it less attractive and possibly seeing a transfer into other investment instruments like short term bonds.

In conjunction with the above possibilities, there are a number of actions that could complement any of the options implemented.

These include more frequent stress tests at fund level and sector wide levels, reverse stress testing and increased MMF reporting demands.

As mentioned, any opinions are to be submitted to the FCA by 23 July 2022.

If you feel you’d like to know more and would like a more expansive and in depth look at the above outline of the proposed reformation of MMFs, please feel free to email myself at chris@ossconsult.co.uk

Chris Watts